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NOTES
STANDING TO OBJECT TO AN UNLAWFUL
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Universal application of the exclusionary rule' does not necessarily pre-
clude the admission of all unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal trial be-
cause to invoke the rule, a defendant must first establish that he has standing.
This requires him to show that the search and seizure invaded certain of his
interests protected by the fourth amendment. "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .-
Traditionally, a person could establish that he was "aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure"' only if he claimed and showed a possessory
1. Simply stated, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence which is the fruit
of an unlawful search and seizure. This rule was deemed necessary to enforce the fourth
amendment.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), was the first case to require the suppres-
sion of evidence illegally acquired by federal agents. The exclusionary rule, however, was
not held to be constitutionally binding upon the states. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). Twelve years later this mandate was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). That case stated the rule to be "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court." Id. at 655. Thus the federal exclusionary rule was constitutionally applied to
the states. The Court's opinion was influenced by the California case of People v. Cahan,
44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), in which the California court adopted the ex-
clusionary rule. In that case Justice Traynor said:
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have
completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the
part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts under the old rule
have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless
activities of law enforcement officers. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property
and to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that ( I)
the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient
on its face, or (3) the property seized is not described in the warrant, or (4) there
was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the
warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall
receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If
the motion is granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to law-
ful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The
motion to suppress evidence may also be made in the district where the trial is to be
had. The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefore
did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the
court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41 (e).
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or proprietary interest in the object seized or the premises searched.4 This
requirement of a claim of ownership or possession often unfairly placed the
defendant in the dilemma of having to claim facts that would incriminate
or possibly even convict him. Also, all temporary guests were unable to
satisfy the requisites of the traditional test and were denied standing even
though their anticipated privacy on the property of another had been
violated by an unlawful search and seizure.' Consequently, the effect of
the traditional requirements for standing was to allow police-without losing
convictions-to seize evidence illegally from those members of the public
who could not or did not choose to claim the requisite possessory or pro-
prietary interest in the object seized or the premises searched. Arguably,
the traditional requisites for standing contravened the effective enforce-
ment of the safeguards of the fourth amendment. Then, along came Jones.
One year before the exclusionary rule was applied to the states, the
Supreme Court examined the traditional standing rules in the federal
courts. In Jones v. United States,4 federal agents found narcotics hidden in
a bird's nest in a window awning of the apartment they were searching
pursuant to a warrant. The defendant was a guest in the apartment that
had been leased by a friend who was away for several days. The defendant
was charged with having "purchased, sold, dispensed and distributed" nar-
cotics and having "facilitated the concealment and sale of" these narcotics.
The Government contended that the defendant lacked standing to challenge
the search and seizure because he had not claimed and shown the requisite
interest in either the narcotics or the apartment.
4. E.g., Chicco v. United States, 284 Fed. 434 (4th Cir. 1922); United States v.
Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
For a general history of the standing rule see Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreason-
ably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. RE,. 471 (1952); Weeks, Standing to Object in the
Field of Search and Seizure, 6 Aluz. L. Rav. 65 (1964); 15 Wyo. L.J. 218 (1961);
Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
5. Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Gibson v. United States,
149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Daddio v. United States, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942);
Mixon v. State, 54 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1951) ; Walker v. State, 200 Ind. 303, 163 N.E. 229
(1928); Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 75 A.2d 327 (1950); Polk v. State, 167 Miss.
506, 142 So. 480 (1932); State v. Cantrell, 310 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1958); Williams v.
State, 35 Okla. Crim. 171, 249 Pac. 433 (1926); Paige v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 571, 279
S.W.2d 344 (1955). The necessary interest needed to give standing was ownership in or
right to possession of the premises. Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir.
1950). However, the interest of a lessee or licensee was enough. United States v. De
Bousi, 32 F.2d 902 (-D. Mass. 1929). Also, the rule was satisfied by one who had
control or dominion. Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952). Em-
ployees, though in control of the premises, lacked the necessary possession. United States
v. Conoscente, 63 F.2d 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 642 (1933); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
6. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion of the Court, asserted that
if Jones had to claim a possessory or proprietary interest in the narcotics
in order to obtain standing, he would be enmeshed in the dilemma' so viv-
idly described by Judge Learned Hand.
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in posses-
sion, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies
of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will
not serve. If they come as victims, they must take on that role, with
enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at the
bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to choose
one horn of the dilemma.'
The facts that the defendant had to claim and prove to obtain standing
were sufficient to convict him of the crime charged. The unfairness of this
dilemma motivated the Court to grant the defendant automatic standing
by exempting him from making the traditional claim.' Thus the first ra-
tionale of Jones predicated standing upon the dilemma.
But the eradication of the dilemma was not the only malady in the
standing rules that was to be cured by the Court. A second innovation in the
law of standing, separate and distinct from the first, was also established.
The subtle historical distinctions between a lessee, licensee, invitee, and
guest were eliminated as bases for depriving a person of standing. To ob-
tain standing a defendant now only has to show that he was legitimately
on the premises searched and that he can invoke the privacy of the premises.
No longer is it necessary to claim and prove ownership, possession, or do-
minion of a premises to obtain standing; mere presence with the consent
of the owner is established as a new basis for standing to challenge the
7. If the defendant disclaims any interest in either the premises searched or the
property seized, he would have no standing to object to the evidence offered, even though
the evidence was unlawfully obtained. If, on the other hand, at the suppression hearing
he admits his interest in the property seized, he will have standing, but this disclosure may
very well convict him if it is used against him at the trial. However, the dilemma may
not exist at all if the admission of a proprietary or possessory interest is inadmissible.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that these admissions may be excluded from the trial in the
future.
At the least, such a defendant has been placed in the criminally tendentious position
of explaining his possession of the premises. He has been faced. . . with the chance
that the allegations made on the motion to suppress may be used against him at the
trial, although that they may is by no means an inevitable holding... Jones v.
United States, supra note 6, at 262. (Emphasis added.)
Most courts, however, do not consider that the claim may be inadmissible, and as a result,
the dilemma is present. This is exemplified by the following statement: "Therefore, if the
defendant failed to sustain the motion to suppress he stood convicted by his own ad-
mission." Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291, 300 (10th Cir. 1965).
8. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932).
9. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 262 (1960).
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legality of a search of a premises. This second rationale of Jones signifi-
cantly enlarges the class of people who can obtain standing.
The interpretation and scope of the two new rationales for standing and
their applicability to cases with subtle variations from the facts of Jones
have created perplexing problems for the courts. In the Jones case, the de-
fendant was in possession of narcotics which were contraband per se; that
is, the fact of possession was the only element needed by the prosecution to
prove a prima facie case. Thus the first rationale is demonstrably applica-
ble to contraband per se cases, but the opinion left unclear whether or not
the rationale should apply to situations in which possession is the central or
essential element of the crime charged, but not the sole element which the
prosecution must affirmatively prove-derivative contraband cases.'" Fur-
thermore, in many situations a possessory or a proprietary interest in an ob-
ject or premises may be seriously incriminating, and an admission by a de-
fendant of his interest may be the basis for his conviction. Whether these
defendants should automatically be given standing under the Jones rationale
is also debatable.
Additional uncertainty, attendant to the second rationale, stems from
the necessary line-drawing of the physical areas where a person may claim
privacy. Do common hallways, lobbies, or backyards afford privacy to a
person? And if so, is the degree of privacy the same for the guest as the
owner? Furthermore, it was not made clear whether guests in automobiles
would fall within the class of defendants who could obtain standing by
showing that their presence was with the consent of the owner.
The full impact of the Jones case is also uncertain. The standing rules
formulated by the Court were based upon its interpretation of Rule 41 (e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and therefore were not binding
upon the states. Furthermore, at the time Jones was decided, the federal
exclusionary rule was not yet binding on the states. Mapp v. Ohio" sub-
sequently extended the federal exclusionary rule to the states, but the ele-
ments of standing to invoke that rule have not been re-examined by the
Supreme Court, and therefore, whether the standing rules set forth in Jones
will be made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
remains unresolved.
10. In derivative contraband crimes, the holding of property, otherwise lawful, is made
illegal upon the finding of other elements. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965). For example, the elements of receiving stolen goods are (1)
possession of (2) stolen goods plus (3) knowledge that they have been stolen. Thus, if it
can be shown that a defendant had knowledge that goods in his possession were stolen, the
goods are derivative contraband.
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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I. STANDING PREDICATED UPON THE DILEMMA
The first rationale of Jones was founded on the notorious Hand dilemma.
A defendant confronted by the dilemma had two choices. On the one hand,
he could attempt to gain standing to challenge the introduction of objects
seized by an alleged unlawful search. This necessitated making a claim and
showing of a possessory or proprietary interest in the objects. Subsequently,
these motions, admissions, and proof could be introduced at the trial as a
basis for his conviction. On the other hand, such a defendant might choose
to forego an attempt to enforce the exclusionary rule, a constitutional guar-
antee under the fourth amendment, and permit the objects seized to be
introduced in the trial as the basis for conviction. Either choice would al-
most inevitably lead to conviction. The first rationale of the Jones opinion
automatically confers standing on a defendant confronted by this dilemma.
In the Jones case, the defendant was charged with having "purchased,
sold, dispensed and distributed" narcotics, and having "facilitated the sale
and concealment of" narcotics, in violation of federal statutes. Although
this indictment did not explicitly charge the defendant with a crime of
possession, the Court reprimanded prosecutors for framing charges generally
to conceal the fact that proof of a defendant's possession of contraband per
se, alone, is sufficient to convict him." Clearly the same element that con-
ferred standing on the defendant, possession, convicted him. For this reason,
restriction of this rationale to contraband per se cases, where possession is
the sole element of the crime, is a possible interpretation of the Jones
opinion.
However, the underlying basis of this rationale, the dilemma, is not
confined to contraband per se cases and may also exist in cases where pos-
session is but one element of the crime, derivative contraband cases. The
dilemma may also exist in varying degrees in cases in which possession of an
12. "Rule 41(e) should not be applied to allow the Government to deprive the
defendant of standing to bring a motion to suppress by framing the indictment in general
terms, while prosecuting for possession." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264-65
(1960). The Ninth Circuit pinpointed the crucial issue: "Where a criminal charge
against a defendant is based upon possession, the Jones case established that the defen-
dant, is, by that very fact, a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure,' .... "
Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1961) (smuggling narcotics); accord,
Plazola v. United States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) (unlawfully concealing and import-
ing narcotics into the United States); see United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942,
945 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
One other factor may induce prosecutors not to frame charges generally. Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), compels the Government to charge the defendant
with possession if it wishes to keep an informer's identity unknown. Any other charge
will necessitate revealing the informer's identity. Therefore, in informant cases prosecu-
tors have another reason not to frame charges generally.
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object is not an element of the crime, but either creates damaging infer-
ences as to the existence of the elements of the crime or substantially links
the defendant to its commission. Yet, in federal and state cases subsequent
to Jones, this rationale has been limited, with one exception,"3 to contraband
per se cases. 4 Consequently many defendants whose plight seems to place
them within the class for whom this rationale was designed are denied its
benefit. A possible explanation for the restrictive interpretation of this ra-
tionale is that it is a substantial departure from the traditional requirement
that a person must claim and show that he has been "aggrieved by an un-
lawful search and seizure." Furthermore, defendants to whom this ra-
tionale would afford standing also usually qualify for standing under either
the traditional rule or the second rationale of Jones. Therefore courts have
had a convenient means of avoiding the complexities of predicating stand-
ing upon the dilemma. 5
A. Situations in Which the Dilemma Emerges
1. Charged with Possession of Contraband Per Se
In the Jones case the defendant's privacy had been invaded by the
federal officers' search of the apartment in which he was staying. In addi-
tion, he was charged with a crime of possession. However, the first rationale
that afforded standing to the defendant was dependent solely upon the
charge of possession and the existence of the dilemma, and in no way
rested upon a finding of an invasion of the privacy of the defendant.
Applying the first rationale of Jones, one federal court 6 and three state
courts17 have conferred standing on defendants charged with possession of
13. Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965) (charged with
possession of derivative contraband).
14. E.g., United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
933 (1964); Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961) ; State v. Pokini, 45
Hawaii 295, 367 P.2d 499 (1961); People v. Kelley, 23 11. 2d 193, 177 N.E.2d 830
(1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 928 (1962); People v. DeFilippis, 54 I1. App. 2d 137,
203 N.E.2d 627, rehearing denied, 54 Ill. App. 2d 145, 203 N.E.2d 631 (1964).
15. United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962); People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.
2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960) (unlawful possession of papers and documents used in
playing policy); Belton v. State, 228 Md. 17, 178 A.2d 407 (1961) (possession of
narcotics); State v. Evans, 75 N.J. Super. 319, 183 A.2d 137 (App. Div. 1962) (unlawful
possession of narcotics); State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964) (pos-
session of obscene material); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962)
(illegal possession of gambling devices). But see note 129 infra.
16. Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961).
17. People v. Mayo, 19 Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960) (search of automobile that
defendant had been driving); State v. Evans, 75 N.J. Super. 319, 183 A.2d 137 (App.
Div. 1962) (search of apartment in which defendant had been staying); see State v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss4/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
contraband per se in situations where the privacy of premises of the defen-
dant had been invaded. More significant are Plazola v. United States,"8 in
which the basis of the charge was possession of contraband per se and the
defendant was given standing even though the objects seized were taken
from another person's automobile, and Thomas v. United States,"9 where the
basis of the charge was also possession of contraband per se and the de-
fendant was given standing even though the search was not in violation of
his right to privacy as protected by the fourth amendment. Each of these
courts has implicitly recognized that under the first rationale of Jones,
standing is predicated upon the dilemma alone and does not also require an
invasion of the defendant's privacy.
However, the Supreme Court of Washington, while recognizing the first
rationale of Jones,"0 denied standing to a defendant charged with possessing
narcotics because "the evidence seized was not on his person, nor was it in or
on property belonging to him; and it was not taken from premises legiti-
mately occupied by him."'" Similarly, in State v. Nobles," the Supreme
Court of New Jersey denied standing to a defendant, charged with possess-
ing and dispensing narcotics, when the contraband was found in a search of
another person, who was probably the defendant's agent. It is submitted
that both of these state courts have erroneously added to the first rationale
of the Jones opinion the requirement of an invasion of the defendant's
privacy.
2. Charged with Possession of Derivative Contraband
Extension of the first rationale of Jones beyond contraband per se cases
depends upon judicial determinations that in other circumstances an ad-
mission of possession by the defendant will be so prejudicial to his case that
it is justifiable to extricate the defendant from his dilemma. In Jones, proof
of possession was the sole element of the crime and therefore was sufficient
to establish a prima facie case against the defendant. In crimes involving
derivative contraband, possession is an essential or central element of the
crime, but not the sole element. Still, it seems that for defendants charged
Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962) (search of defendant's wife's automo-
bile).
18. 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) (charged with unlawfully concealing and importing
narcotics).
19. 216 F. Supp. 942 (NJD. Cal. 1963).
20. State v. Loran, 62 Wash. 2d 4, 380 P.2d 733 (1963); State v. Michaels, 60
Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
21. State v. Loran, supra note 20, at 5, 380 P.2d at 734 (narcotics tossed on premises
of a stranger). But cf. Williams v. United States, 237 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
22. 79 N.J. Super. 442, 191 A.2d 793 (App. Div. 1963).
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with possession of derivative contraband, the Hand-Frankfurter dilemma
looms as fatefully as in cases charging possession of contraband per se.
Two federal courts of appeals have been confronted with cases involv-
ing charges of possession of derivative contraband and have reached opposite
conclusions as to the applicability of the first rationale of Jones. In United
States v. Konigsberg,23 the defendant, charged with unlawful possession of
goods stolen from interstate commerce, attempted to challenge the introduc-
tion of the goods allegedly stolen. In denying the defendant standing, the
court stressed that possession was "only one element of the crime charged," 4
and thus limited the first rationale of Jones to contraband per se cases.
However, in Simpson v. United States,5 the defendant, charged with unlaw-
ful possession of an automobile transported in interstate commerce, was
given standing under the first rationale of Jones. That the charge was one
of possessing derivative contraband and not of possessing contraband per se
did not cloud the fact that "possession was the basis for conviction"' 6 and
that the dilemma was therefore ominously present.
3. Theft Crimes in Which the Defendant Attempts to Suppress the Stolen
Objects
Larceny, robbery, and related crimes always require proof of the defen-
dant's taking possession of the stolen objects at some time." Therefore, an
admission by the defendant of his possession of the stolen objects will re-
lieve the prosecutor of proving one critical fact and, at the same time, will
create damaging inferences as to the defendant's guilt. Again the dilemma
appears, although admittedly the alternatives are less damaging to the
defendant than in cases where he is charged with a crime of possession.
Yet this dilemma may still induce a defendant to forego an attempt to
challenge the legality of a search.s
Arguments have been made that the first rationale of Jones covers these
situations and eliminates the need for claiming a possessory interest in the
objects seized, but so far this reasoning has been rejected." In People v.
Kelley,"0 the defendant, charged with armed robbery, had been observed
by the police, immediately after a robbery, running down an alley. He was
23. 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964).
24. Id. at 847.
25. 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).
26. Id. at 295.
27. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 201 (1957).
28. Accardo v. United States, 347 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
29. People v. Kelley, 23 Il1. 2d 193, 177 N.E.2d 830 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
928 (1962); People v. DeFilippis, 54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627 (1964).
30. Supra note 29.
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stopped, searched, and the watch and the wallet of the victim were seized.
However, in his motion to suppress the objects, the defendant refused to
claim a possessory interest in the objects, obviously because of the nexus that
the claim would have established between himself and the crime. Because
of his refusal to make the claim, the defendant was denied standing; the
Jones case was distinguished on the ground that the defendant was not
charged with possession of the articles.
4. Other Cases in Which the Fact of Possession May be Incriminating
In many criminal cases, an admission by the defendant of possession of
certain objects may establish a damaging evidentiary link between the de-
fendant and the commission of the crime charged, or may tend to establish
elements of the crime charged. For these reasons, in a motion to suppress,
a defendant may be reluctant to claim a possessory interest in the objects
in order to obtain standing-again the dilemma. However, in these situa-
tions the admissions by the defendant will be less damaging to his case than
the admissions required in any of the above-mentioned three categories. To
extend the first rationale of Jones to confer automatic standing on a de-
fendant confronted by a dilemma of this nature would not appear to be an
unwarranted application of the rationale, but it is clearly a substantial ex-
tension. No court to date has been willing to accept this expansive inter-
pretation. 31 For example, in State v. Pokini,' an armed robbery case, evi-
dentiary materials-guns, cartridges, and clips-were seized from a stolen
automobile which the defendants had occupied. Even though an admission
of possession of these articles would have been substantially incriminating
on the issue of whether force had been used, the court was unwilling to
grant standing to the defendants under the first rationale of Jones, limiting
31. State v. Pokini, 45 Hawaii 295, 367 P.2d 499 (1961); see Taylor v. United
States, 326 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.), cert..denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); Ramirez v. United
States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942, 945
(N.D. Cal. 1963). In Ramirez, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully selling, con-
cealing, receiving and facilitating the transportation of heroin. He attempted to suppress
money, identifiable by serial number, which had been used by authorities to purchase
narcotics from him and which had been seized from the defendant's wife at the time
they were both arrested. The Ninth Circuit denied standing to the defendant because
he refused, understandably, to claim a possessory or proprietary interest in the money.
Had he admitted a proprietary interest in the money, it would not have been difficult for
the jury to infer that the defendant at one time possessed the narcotics and was guilty
of the crime charged. Obviously, the defendant was enmeshed in a dilemma, and it
would not have been unreasonable to afford the defendant standing under these circum-
stances, applying the first rationale of Jones.
32. Supra note 31.
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its application to crimes in which the defendant had been charged with
possession of contraband per se."3
B. Existence of the Dilemma
Assuming that the possessory or proprietary interest which the defendant
must claim and show to challenge the legality of a search and seizure is
incriminating, a dilemma does not exist unless the prosecutor may use the
claim and supporting admissions at the trial. Mr. Justice Frankfurter as-
sumed in the Jones case that these admissions were admissible at the trial. 4
The validity of this foundation assumption is weakened by significant case
law and legal theory that support the proposition that the claim required
cannot be admitted as evidence at the trial. However, uncertainty in the law
could easily give rise to a fear in the minds of a defendant and his counsel
that the admissions made in a suppression hearing would be admitted.
There are three ways that a damaging admission can be made at a
suppression hearing: (1) in the motion to suppress or to return evidence;
(2) in an affidavit supporting this motion; or (3) in testimony given by
the defendant either to prove his claim or to describe the conduct of the
search. A motion to suppress is required to initiate the procedure for en-
forcing the fourth amendment." In essence, this is a pleading in which
33. Id. at 315, 367 P.2d at 509.
34. Apparently this assumption resulted from several views that had recently appeared
in the District of Columbia, where the Jones case originated. Judge Bazelon noted the
basic assumption needed for the existence of the dilemma-that the claim could be used
as evidence at the trial. Christensen v. United States, 259 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(dissenting opinion). Another judge of that court, Judge Fahy, also assumed that the
claim could be used as evidence at the trial and agreed with Judge Bazelon that a
defendant, seeking to acquire the protection of the fourth amendment, should not be re-
quired to admit possession when the Government has proved this at the trial. Brandon
v. United States, 270 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (concurring opinion), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 943 (1960). Although the court did not allow the use of the claim in
these cases, these judges assumed that the present law might allow admissions against
interest made at the suppression hearing to be used as evidence at the trial. With this
assumption the dilemma became real to them. Their solution was that when the prosecu-
tion proved the fact of possession at the trial, the defendant could then raise the motion to
suppress and acquire standing by using the prosecutor's own proof. Brandon v. United
States, supra at 317 (concurring opinion) ; Christensen v. United States, supra at 199
(dissenting opinion); Williams v. United States, 237 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1956); see
Wyche v. United States, 193 F.2d 703, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (concurring opinion),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1952). On the other hand, Chief Judge Edgerton of that
court did not believe that a dilemma existed because the claim could not be admitted at
the trial. Wilkins v. United States, 258 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 942 (1958). It is possible that this conflict in the District of
Columbia Circuit, from which the Jones case arose, prompted the Supreme Court to
assume the possibility of the dilemma and establish the first rationale of Jones.
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
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the defendant alleges that he has the requisite interest for standing and
that the conduct of the police has been unlawful. As with any other mo-
tion, the burden of producing evidence to substantiate the averments is on
the moving party."8 The defendant may do this by submitting an affidavit,"
by testifying, or by producing evidence obtained from independent sources,
such as affidavits of the police officers who conducted the search."8 Of
course, the defendant will choose, if possible, to support his allegations with
independent evidence to avoid making damaging admissions. However, in
some circumstances he is unable to do so, and is therefore required to testify
in his own behalf that he had the requisite interest to establish standing."
Since all three types of admissions are actual prerequisites for invoking the
fourth amendment, they will be treated alike in this analysis.
1. Legal Doctrines that Preclude the Use of Admissions Made at a Sup-
pression Hearing
a. subsequent use violates the fifth amendment. If admissions made in
the suppression hearing cannot subsequently be used as evidence, the
dilemma does not exist. In Safarik v. United States,"' the defendants had
leased a garage and chicken coop. After receiving several tips from anony-
mous telephone callers, federal agents peered through the windows of the
garage and observed tin cans of a type regularly used in the local bootleg
trade. On the following morning, the agents entered the chicken coop and
seized several cans which contained illegal alcohol. They then set up sur-
veillance details both across the street and in an adjacent house. That
evening the defendants drove an automobile next to the chicken coop and
began loading cans into the car. The agents thereupon arrested the de-
fendants and, incidental to the arrest, seized the remainder of the alcohol.
36. Brandon v. United States, 270 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United States v.
Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
37. In the past, an affidavit by the defendant has been allowed to support his motion
and establish a prima facie case. E.g., In re Number 32 E. Sixty-seventh St., 96 F.2d 153
(2d ir. 1938); United States v. Edelson, 83 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1936); Safarik v. United
States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933); Vaught v. United States, 7 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.
1925). Defendants have preferred to use an affidavit because it included essentially the
same assertion as in the required claim. However, in United States v. Warrington, 17
F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955), an attempt was made to clarify the role of affidavits
supporting the initial motion in suppression hearings. The court ruled that affidavits were
not evidence for this purpose and that the motion to suppress must be supported by other
evidence. Id. at 29.
38. See Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Daniels,
10 F.R.D. 225 (D.N.J. 1950).
39. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
40. 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933).
Washington University Open Scholarship
STANDING TO OBJECT
The defendants filed a single set of papers-a motion to suppress and sup-
porting affidavits-to suppress all of the evidence obtained from both
searches. The trial court suppressed the four cans obtained during the first
search, but decided that the seizures made at the time of the arrest were law-
ful since there was sufficient evidence, independent of what was learned on
the previous unlawful search, to support probable cause. However, the
government was allowed to introduce at the trial both the motion to sup-
press and the supporting affidavits. In these papers, the defendants had al-
leged both that they owned the liquor seized and that they were lessees of
the premises. The Eighth Circuit held that this evidence was not admissible
at the trial. The court reasoned that, "the documents were tantamount to
a written confession of guilt,"'" and even though the formal rules of evi-
dence allow admissions against interest to be admitted at the trial, their ad-
mission in this situation would make "a rule of evidence, and not the Con-
stitution of the United States, the supreme law of the land. To hold
so would render the constitutional guaranties sonorous but impotent
phrases."'" Thus the court destroyed the dilemma by holding that the de-
fendants were entitled to the protection of the fifth amendment as well as
the fourth, and that no defendant should have to incriminate himself in
order to invoke his fourth amendment rights.
The language in Safarik does not support a differentiation in treatment
of admissions made in a suppression hearing in which the search was held
to be legal from those in which the search was held to be illegal. 3 However,
the government filed a motion for rehearing," claiming, among other
things, that the court had overlooked a case, Kaiser v. United States,4 1
which had been decided only a year before. Kaiser involved a legal search
in which the motion to suppress had been introduced at the trial. In that
case, the Eighth Circuit had held that the claim of possession made in
the motion was admissible because the record of the admission was public
and the admission was voluntarily given.4' The motion for a rehearing
of the Safarik case was denied, but, unfortunately, instead of overruling
Kaiser, the court distinguished that case because it involved a lawful
search.
41. Id. at 897.
42. Ibid.
43. Also, the language of the Safarik case does not support a differentiation in the
treatment of admissions made in testimony, motions, or affidavits, if they are made to
support the claim of interest.
44. Safarik v. United States, 63 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1933).
45. 60 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932).
46. Id. at 413.
47. Safarik v. United States, 63 F.2d 369, 370 (8th Cir. 1933).
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If the legality of the search had made a difference to the court in Safarik,
it had ample grounds for admitting the motion and affidavit. The defen-
dant had filed only one motion to suppress the evidence obtained in two
searches, one legal and the other illegal. Because one of the searches to
which the motion and affidavit referred was legal, the court could have
admitted these statements as incidents of this lawful search. It is sub-
mitted that the court, in its principal opinion, was correctly unconcerned
with this distinction. At the time the claim is required the legality of the
search will probably be questionable, and the defendant should not be re-
quired to risk any detrimental effects of an adverse decision on the legality
of the search, even if they are minimal.49 To say that admissibility does
depend upon the outcome of a suppression hearing might induce defendants,
against whom a questionable search has been made, to waive their fourth
amendment right in order to preserve their fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.50
Since the fifth amendment renders the claim and the required support
inadmissible, the defendant has no reason to fear its use in subsequent
formal proceedings. The only possible incriminating effect that could re-
sult from the claim is that it might give the prosecution personal knowledge
of the truth of possession which it did not have before the suppression mo-
tion and hearing. However, it would be an unusual case if a prosecutor
charged a person with a crime which involves possession without substantial
evidence that the defendant was actually in possession.
If the legal theory of self-incrimination were universally applied to all ad-
missions made at suppression hearings, the dilemma would be non-existent.
b. subsequent use violates the "'fruits-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine.
If the admissions in a successful suppression hearing cannot be admitted at
the trial, the asserted dilemma is illusory. In Fabri v. United States,5 1
officers, pursuant to a search warrant, searched the residence of the defen-
dant and seized quantities of prohibited intoxicating liquor. Later, the
48. Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933).
49. For a complete analysis of this issue see p. 502 infra.
50. In Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933), the court stated:
At all stages of the trial defendants were entitled to the protection of both these[fourth and fifth amendment] guaranties. They protect all persons, including the
accused, suspected, and guilty, as well as the innocent, and should be liberally
construed in favor of the individual. Id. at 897.
It is submitted that the fifth amendment right should not depend upon whether the
fourth amendment right has been violated. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925). Since Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), it has been recognized that
these rights complement each other. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 666 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
51. 24 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1928).
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defendant moved that the search warrant be quashed and the evidence
suppressed and returned. The trial court quashed the warrant and sup-
pressed the evidence, but the prosecutor refused to return the seized liquor.
The government relied on the averments in the defendant's petition to
show that the possession of the material was unlawful and that it should
not be returned. Therefore, the government's case rested entirely upon
the facts obtained as a result of the unlawful search. The court held that
evidence obtained in this manner could not be used as support for the gov-
ernment's contention that possession of the seized objects was inherently
unlawful.5 " The legal theory that admissions made at a successful suppres-
sion hearing are fruits of an unlawful search was an alternative basis for
the decision in the Safarik case,"s and has recently been accepted as valid in
Fowler v. United States.54
The validity of this theory may be weakened by the fact that the claim
of possession made in the motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing
comes long after the search. In Wong Sun v. United States,5 the Supreme
Court allowed the introduction of a confession voluntarily made by the de-
fendant several days after he had been released. The basis for the Court's de-
cision was that even though the police had originally found the defendant
through the fruits of their illegal activity, the confession was not tainted be-
cause it was obtained "by means sufficiently distinguishable [from the illegal
search] to be purged of the primary taint."5 Possibly, the length of time
between a search and admissions made at a suppression hearing has not
been considered relevant to the application of the fruits doctrine because
these admissions are required for the enforcement of the fourth amendment
and, therefore, are not voluntary.
The "fruits" approach has been adopted in the Eighth,57 Ninth,58 and
Tenth" Circuits. If the search is clearly unlawful in these jurisdictions, the
dilemma is non-existent, because admissions made at suppression hearings
can never be used. But prior to the suppression hearing, the defendant is
52. However, if the search is deemed lawful, an admission by the defendant will be
admitted at the trial. Vaught v. United States, 7 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1925).
53. Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933).
54. 239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956). The court noted that Safarik v. United States,
supra note 53, had held that admissions made at the suppression hearing were inadmis-
sible at the trial; however, it attributed this holding to the fruits doctrine only and thus
ignored the fifth amendment argument of the case. After accepting the validity of the
fruits doctrine, the court stated that it only applied when the evidence was illegally seized
but not in the instant case where the search was held legal.
55. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
56. Id. at 488.
57. Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1932).
58. Fabri v. United States, 24 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1928).
59. Fowler v. United States, 239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956).
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aware of the possibility that the search may be held lawful and that any ad-
missions made by him at the suppression hearing may be introduced at the
trial along with the evidence seized. Even with this possibility in mind, it is
submitted that the dilemma exists only in a negligible sense, if at all. The
defendant recognizes that if he loses the suppression hearing, the prosecutor's
evidence will usually be overwhelming, and the admissions made at the
suppression hearing will not be needed. For this reason the defendant need
not be apprehensive of the introduction of his admissions at the trial to
bolster the already conclusive evidence against him."0 Only in an unusual
case will the admission by the defendant be a crucial factor necessary to
convict the defendant.
2. The Rationale Supporting the Introduction at the Trial of Admissions
Made at the Suppression Hearing
In some jurisdictions the self-incrimination and fruits doctrines have not
been recognized, and the claim and supporting admissions have been ad-
mitted at the trial.61 The underlying theory used to support this result is
that the admissions were voluntarily made. However, it is not clear whether
the courts have accepted the proposition because no person is required to
enforce his fourth amendment right, 2 or because the specific defendant sup-
ported his claim by his own admission when he could have used indepen-
dent sources.
In Heller v. United States,"' the defendant was convicted of violating
60. The lack of many reported instances of the introduction of admissions made at
unsuccessful suppression hearings leads to a belief that prosecutors do not, in fact, attempt
this tactic. One could hypothesize that admissions are not used because of a belief by
prosecutors that this practice would be unfair. However, it is more likely that prosecutors
are afraid of the consequences of later use because of the fifth amendment logic applied
in the Sal arik case.
61. The following cases allow the motion to suppress evidence to be admitted at trial.
United States v. Taylor, 326 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964)
(court cited Kaiser but not Safarik); Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 654 (1932); Vaught v. United States, 7 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.
1925); United States v. Lindsly, 7 F.2d 247 (E.D. La.), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.2d
771 (5th Cir. 1925). The following authorities support the view that testimony given at
the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence may be admitted at the trial. Heller v.
United States, 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 567 (1932); 2 VARON,
SEARCHES, SEIzuREs AND IMMUNITIES 682 (1961). One case has allowed both the mo-
tion and testimony to be admitted. State v. Williams, 69 Ohio App. 361, 41 N.E.2d 717
(1941). One case has treated the affidavit and claim as voluntary and admitted them at
the trial. Bell v. State, 94 Tex. Crim. 266, 250 S.W. 177 (1923), writ of error dismissed,
266 U.S. 640 (1924).
62. See Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
63. 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 507 (1932).
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the National Prohibition Act. He testified at the suppression hearing that
the house which was searched was his residence. After losing on his motion
to suppress, the defendant went on to trial where the testimony he gave at
the suppression hearing was admitted into evidence. The Seventh Circuit de-
cided that the admission of this evidence was correct. The court reasoned
that if the admission were made out of court it would be admissible, and
since it was in a public record, it could even be printed in the newspaper.
Furthermore, since the defendant was not obligated to testify upon the mo-
tion any more than a defendant is obligated to testify in his defense at the
trial, the testimony was voluntary. The dissenting opinion", pointed out
that it was necessary for the defendant to apply for return or suppression in
order to protect himself from illegally seized evidence, and once the motion
was made the defendant had the burden of proving the truth of the allega-
tions by testimony. To allow this evidence to be admitted at the trial would
vitiate the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule.
If the defendant has testified at the suppression hearing to support the
claim made in the motion, a problem always arises, as it did in Heller, of
whether this testimony was voluntary. The traditional rule requires that
the defendant claim and show a proprietary or possessory interest in the ob-
ject seized or the premises searched, but it does not require that the de-
fendant accuse himself if he can produce independent evidence of his
interest. However, the defendant may be forced to testify against himself
if he has no other means of proving the validity of the claim."5 If he must
testify, his testimony serves the same purpose as his motion to suppress, i.e.,
he must testify to preserve his fourth amendment right. 6 Therefore, it seems
that there is no reason for different treatment of affidavits, testimony sup-
porting the motion to suppress, and the initial motion to suppress. It is
possible that if a defendant needlessly admits his interest when he could have
64. Id. at 629-30.
65. Although others may exist, there are two situations which immediately come to
mind in which the defendant will have no other means of supporting the claim except by
his own testimony. An arresting officer's testimony cannot be used if several defendants
were searched simultaneously and the officer does not know who owned, possessed or
controlled the premises. See United States v. Daniels, 10 F.R.D. 225 (D.N.J. 1950).
Also, if two people are searched and the arresting officer testifies that one had possession,
the other can establish his interest only with an independent source, usually his own
testimony. A final problem in this area is the suggestion by some courts that standing will
not be conferred unless the defendant accepts the truth of the testimony given by the
officer to support the claim of interest. United States v. Stein, 53 F. Supp. 911
(W.D.N.Y. 1943); see Harvey v. United States, 193 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 927 (1952).
66. See Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 567 (1932).
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proved it in some other way, a court might view his testimony as voluntary.
But this would require factual findings of the evidence available to the de-
fendant at the time of the admission or an evaluation of whether the de-
fendant reasonably believed that his testimony was required. These tasks
seem impracticable. Furthermore, if the rationale of the courts in these
cases is that the defendant's choice to enforce the fourth amendment is
voluntary, they are maintaining the untenable position that to enforce the
fourth amendment, the defendant must waive his fifth amendment right."7
3. Specificity of the Claim
Even assuming that the claim may be admitted as evidence at the trial,
the defendant still may not fear the later use of the claim if it may be
phrased in such a manner that it does not incriminate the defendant."
A claim of this nature could either be non-descriptive, such as, officers took
property from me, or be descriptive of only the outside container in which
the incriminating evidence was contained, such as, officers took a brown
package from my possession. 9 This latter means of avoiding the dilemma
67. Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933); Heller v. United States,
supra note 66, at 630 (dissenting opinion).
68. A related method has been tried by some defense attorneys to avoid the incrim-
mating effect of the claim. The attorney signs the motion to suppress instead of the
defendant. In Fowler v. United States, 239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956), the motion to
suppress, alleging that the property seized belonged to the defendant, was signed by tho
attorney. Later, the defendant disclaimed any interest and asserted that his attorney's
claim was untrue. The Tenth Circuit analogized the situation to pleadings in civil actions
and stated that "pleadings in former cases or those which have been superseded by other
pleadings, not under oath, and signed only by attorneys for the parties, without further
proof of authority, are incompetent as admissions of the parties." Id. at 95. However,
the court decided to admit the motion as an admission against interest, cautioning the
jury that Fowler was not otherwise bound by the statement of his attorney.
Professor Wigmore considers a similar situation in criminal cases in which a withdrawn
guilty plea is later offered as evidence. Noting that the authorities are divided on its
admissibility, he comes to the conclusion that these statements can be introduced like any
other evidence so long as they are introduced "at the proper time," giving the defendant
a chance to explain them. 4 WIGoORE, EvIDENcE § 1070 (3d ed. 1940).
In jurisdictions where the attorney is allowed to appear and establish standing for a
defendant, see In re Number 32 E. Sixty-seventh St., 96 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1938), it
seems likely that the courts will deal strictly with a defendant who attempts to disclaim.
Even if the defendant is not held to the truthfulness of the attorney's assertions, the court
is likely to declare the suppression hearing invalid and require the defendant himself to
make a new motion which specifically states his grounds for standing. It is submitted
that this method is based on a highly technical distinction on which defense attorneys
should be wary of relying.
69. Fabri v. United States, 24 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1928) (defendant described liquor
by its containers); United States v. Edelson, 83 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1936). In Edelson the
defendant's petition alleged "only that 'he was in possession under a lease' of the
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could be effectively used to suppress narcotics which, in most instances, are
carried in containers."0 Although there is little authority from which to
ascertain how many trial courts allow defendants to make either type of in-
specific claim, a defendant may avoid the dilemma if he does so. Since little
is admitted, the defendant has little to fear. Consequently, in jurisdictions
where the inspecific claim is permissible, standing should not be predicated
upon an illusory dilemma. In the majority of jurisdictions, however, the
specific claim is required7 and standing may be validly predicated upon the
dilemma.
C. Analysis of the Jones Solution
The facts of the Jones case involved a defendant who was charged with a
crime of possessing contraband per se, and since the fact of possession alone
would convict, the defendant would confess his guilt if, to obtain standing,
he were to claim a possessory interest in the narcotics. Therefore, the case
represented the most striking example of the effect of the dilemma. The
solution offered by the Court was to exempt the defendant from making
the claim traditionally required. However, the solution has been limited,
unfortunately, by subsequent decisions"2 to "cases where the indictment
premises," and that an unregistered still was seized. The supporting affidavit referred
also to certain papers. The court accepted this as enough even though it cautioned that
more of a claim should be alleged and proved. Id. at 406. Both these methods were
attempted in United States v. Stein, 53 F. Supp. 911 (W.D.N.Y. 1943). The defendant
moved for the suppression and return of (1) memoranda, including slips, receipts, and
papers, and (2) all other evidence taken from him. Ibid. The motion was supported by a
rather nebulous affidavit claiming the "search was made of the content of the same and
the bag and the entire content was seized from the deponent." Thus both methods of
inspecific claiming were attempted. Actually a large quantity of gold bullion was con-
cealed in the bag. The court denied this motion because the allegations were too in-
specific to establish standing. Probably the majority of jurisdictions bar inspecific claims.
70. It is possible that even the admission of possession of a container may become in-
criminating. The claim could be used to fortify the testimony of a witness of questionable
credibility who testified that the defendant was in possession of narcotics.
71. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932) (landmark case); United
States v. Daniels, 10 F.R.D. 225 (D.N.J. 1950); United States v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 391
(W.D.N.Y. 1941); see United States v. Taylor, 326 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 931 (1964); United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
72. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the limitation of the first rationale to charges of possessing contraband
may allow a prosecutor to avoid application of the Jones rule by simply charging offenses
that are not founded on possession. For example, the typical armed robbery indictment
in New York includes charges for: (1) robbery in the first degree, (2) assault in the first
degree, (3) grand larceny in the first degree and (4) unlawful possession of a weapon.
Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAc. LAw. 35, 38 (1962). According to
the interpretation that has been given Jones, the prosecutor can prevent the defendant
from qualifying for automatic standing by deviating from his usual practice of charging
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itself charges possession."" Consequently, standing is still denied to some
defendants who fear to establish standing because of the dilemma. Only a
single federal circuit has extended the rationale to cases involving deriva-
tive contraband, 4 and no court has been willing to eliminate the require-
ment of claiming and proving a possessory or proprietary interest in the
objects seized for defendants charged with theft or other crimes in which
the admission of possession of certain evidence would be particularly in-
criminating."5 Also, a defendant may be placed in a similar dilemma if he
must claim and prove an interest in certain types of premises, for example,
a disorderly house. The first branch of Jones, if limited to crimes of posses-
sion, does not exempt these defendants even though they are also "in a very
real sense" on the horns of a dilemma. These inequities could have been
avoided by precluding all admissions made at the suppression hearing from
the trial." The requirement of the claim and the proof would still be es-
sential to obtain standing, but no admissions could be introduced at the trial.
This solution offers simplicity and ease of application, and eliminates the
need for differentiating between the various situations in which the dilemma
arises.
II. STANDING BASED ON AN INVASION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S
"PRIVACY INTERESTS" IN THE PREMISES SEARCHED
If a defendant was unable or unwilling to claim a possessory or pro-
prietary interest in the object seized, he could still obtain standing under the
pre-Jones law by claiming and proving a possessory or proprietary interest in
the premises searched.7" Proof of such interests was the only means of
establishing that one was aggrieved by an unlawful search of the premises;
an offense of illegal possession among the several offenses usually charged. But see note
12 supra and accompanying text.
73. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
74. Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.), petition for rehearing
denied, 346 F.2d 295 (1965).
75. E.g., State v. Pokini, 45 Hawaii 295, 367 P.2d 499 (1961); People v. Kelly, 23
Ill. 2d 193, 177 N.E.2d 830 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 928 (1962); People v.
DeFilippis, 54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627, petition for rehearing denied, 54 Ill.
App. 2d 145, 203 N.E.2d 631 (1964).
76. The Court also could have expressed its holding in language that had to be inter-
preted as exempting every defendant faced with the dilemma from making the claim. This
approach would have required defining a class which includes all defendants who could
establish standing by the traditional rule if uninhibited by the apprehension that the
claim might be introduced at the trial. However, this determination would have to be
made solely by examining the prosecutor's indictment and without asking the defendant
to claim and show his interest. When confronted with this problem, the Supreme Court
exempted only those defendants charged with a crime of possession, the class most
obviously enmeshed in the dilemma.
77. For authority for this proposition see note 4 supra.
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and only by this method could a defendant suppress all of the objects
seized. All invitees and licensees were precluded from obtaining standing by
this means and consequently from suppressing all evidence seized as a result
of the search."5 The anomalous result that flowed from this traditional rule
was to permit the owner to gain standing but to deny standing to his guest
who legitimately occupied the premises at the time of the search.79 If the
search produced the only evidence that could convict both the owner and
the guest, the owner would be able to escape conviction, but his guest
would not. Thus, it is likely that this traditional rule failed to inhibit illegal
police practices.
In Jones v. United States,"0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, recognizing the
fallibilities of a standing rule based on real property interests, propounded a
new means for establishing that one was aggrieved by an unlawful search
of a premises.
No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous en-
forcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that
anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge
its legality by ways of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are pro-
posed to be used against him. This would of course not avail those
who, by virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of
the premises searched."'
Applying this rationale, the Court decided that a guest in the apartment of
another could invoke the privacy of the premises and could thus obtain
standing to challenge the legality of a search of the premises. Furthermore,
78. For authority for this proposition see note 5 supra.
79. Payne v. State, 330 P.2d 382, 383 (Okla. Grim. App. 1958).
If this situation occurs and the defendants are tried together, then at the trial the
evidence will be admissible against one defendant, but not the other. Since the same
jurors will judge the guilt of both defendants and will see the suppressed evidence, they
will be tempted to infer the value of the evidence against the defendant who suppressed
the evidence even though instructed to the contrary. Since it is impossible to be certain
that the jury disregards the evidence, the only solution is to allow a severance to assure
that only defendants against whom equal evidence can be produced will be tried together.
This may be difficult since the common law rule allows severance if the prosecution re-
quests it and leaves the matter entirely to the discretion of the court if requested by the
defense. E.g., United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480 (1827); Jackson v.
State, 104 Ala. 1, 16 So. 523 (1894); Malone v. State, 77 Miss. 812, 26 So. 968
(1900). For a discussion of common law severance see ABBOTT, CRIMINAL TRIAL PRAc-
TrICE § 162 (4th ed. 1939); BIsHoP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1018 (4th ed. 1895);
53 Ass. JuR. Trial § 56 (1945). The law on severance today is generally covered by
statutes which either codify the common law or make severance mandatory at the
election of the accused. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-2106 to -2109 (1948); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 631.03 (1956).
80. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
81. Id. at 267.
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this rationale establishes that both owners and their guests are aggrieved
in the same way by an unlawful search of the premises, and both would
have standing to suppress all evidence illegally seized. -
The application of this rationale for standing forces the courts to analyze
the bounds of privacy of premises protected by the fourth amendment.
First, the requirement of "legitimately on the premises" necessitates defin-
ing those classes of individuals who may invoke the privacy of premises
which they occupy. Secondly, and more difficult, is defining in what physi-
cal areas an individual's "privacy interests" in the premises are invaded by
an alleged unlawful search of the premises.
A. "Legitimately on the Premises"
In Jones, the defendant established that the lessee of the apartment had
consented to his presence there. With one exception, 3 the courts applying
the second rationale of Jones have similarly defined "legitimately" so as to
include all individuals present with the express or implied consent of the
person who had a possessory or proprietary interest in the premises; there-
fore only trespassers are excluded from utilizing this new rationale to ob-
tain standing. 4
However, in one maverick decision, State v. Keeling,"2 it was held that an
individual could not be "legitimately on the premises" if his sole reason for
82. E.g., United States ex rel. Eastman v. Fay, 225 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 954 (1965); State v. Manetti, 189 A.2d 426 (Del. Super. Ct.
1963); Vines v. State, 397 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Grim. App. 1966); see United States ex
rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963). Some states, however, have
not been convinced of the soundness of this rationale. State v. Carr, 2 Conn. Cir. 247,
197 A.2d 663 (1963) (guests of a barber shop proprietor were denied standing); Combs
v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1961) (son at grandfather's home denied stand-
ing); Head v. State, 246 Miss. 203, 136 So. 2d 619, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962);
State v. Worley, 383 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); State
v. Callaghan, 144 Mont. 401, 396 P.2d 821 (1964); State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372
P.2d 837 (1962) (lawful bailee of an automobile denied standing); MeDoulett v. State,
368 P.2d 522 (Okla. Grim. App. 1961); Commonwealth v. Smith, 201 Pa. Super. 511,
193 A.2d 778 (1963); Gaskin v. State, 365 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Grim. App. 1963).
However, if the tenant gives consent to a search, that consent will bind the guest.
Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1965). On the other hand, if the guest
gives consent, this does not bind the owner. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.
1965).
83. State v. Keeling, 182 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
84. State v. Pokini, 45 Hawaii 295, 367 P.2d 499 (1961) (stolen automobile); Britt
v. State, 242 Ind. 548, 180 N.E.2d 235 (1962) (trespasser in a home); Slyter v. State,
246 Miss. 402, 149 So. 2d 489 (1963) (stolen automobile); State v. Liosi, 91 Ohio L.
Abs. 161, 185 N.E.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1962) (trespasser in a leased basement); Lucus v.
State, 368 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Grim. App.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 925 (1963) (trespasser
in apartment).
85. 182 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
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being there was for unlawful purposes." Applying this reasoning, one de-
fendant, a guest in an apartment who knew nothing of the illegal gambling
activities, was granted standing but the other guests who were engaged in
the gambling activities were denied standing. This interpretation of "legi-
mately on the premises" seems to be inconsistent with the purposes of the
second rationale of Jones, that is to inhibit illegal police practices by en-
larging the class of people whose privacy is invaded by a search. Also this
definition of "legitimately" narrows the privacy of premises rationale of
Jones, contrary to its intended goal of liberalizing standing requirements to
effectuate the fourth amendment's safeguards of the right of privacy. More-
over, in Jones, the defendant was using the premises as a hideout for nar-
cotics, an unlawful activity. The Court did not even consider the question
of whether this was his sole purpose for being in the apartment but rather
only whether he was present with the consent of the lessee.
B. "Privacy Interests" in the Premises Searched
The breadth of the second rationale of Jones also depends upon the
areas in which a person may invoke the privacy of the premises searched.
Consideration must also be given to whether the "privacy interests" of a
temporary visitor, "legitimately on the premises," are the same as those of
the person who has a possessory or proprietary interest in the premises. Since
the purpose of the second rationale of Jones was to liberalize standing rules
and to broaden the scope of privacy of premises safeguarded by the fourth
amendment, it is possible that wherever the privacy of the premises is in-
vaded as to one individual, it is invaded as to all others legitimately on the
premises. Therefore each can establish an invasion of his privacy, the requi-
site for standing.
Clearly, a search of an individual's home or apartment is a sufficient
invasion of his privacy to give him standing to challenge the legality of the
search." Since Jones, temporary dwellers and other visitors, licensees or
invitees, also have been held to have standing to challenge the legality of a
search of a home or apartment made while they were "legitimately on the
premises."'ss In these situations, closely analogous to the facts of Jones, the
86. The decision in this case, if followed to its logical extreme, would make the
suppression hearing the ultimate forum for the question of guilt. The question of stand-
ing would turn on the lawfulness of the defendant's activities. If his activities were lawful,
he would get standing; if unlawful, he would not.
87. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
88. Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Blitz, 199
F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Leveson v. State, 138 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1962); Belton v.
State, 228 Md. 17, 178 A.2d 409 (1962); see Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th
Cir. 1963); Smith v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1964).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss4/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
courts have recognized that the privacy of both owner and visitor is invaded
by a search of the premises. However, if a search occurs after a temporary
guest has left the home or apartment of another, the temporary guest ap-
parently will not be able to obtain standing by claiming that the search
invaded his privacy." He is unable to meet the "legitimately on the
premises" requirement. Yet the "privacy interests" of the owner are in-
vaded by a search of his premises irrespective of his presence or absence.
A private business office of an individual may be likened to his home in
the sense that there is the same reasonable expectation that the privacy of
the premises will not be violated by an unlawful search. Accordingly, a
search of a business office is an invasion of the privacy of the premises of
the person who uses the office whether or not he is present.9" If a temporary
guest is present in a private office when a search occurs, it would seem that
a search of the premises would infringe upon his expectations of privacy
in the same way it would infringe upon the right of privacy of the usual
occupant, and the guest should therefore have standing. If, however, the
office did not afford any privacy to the usual occupant, then it could hardly
be said that a guest could invoke the privacy of the premises."'
The privacy of an individual in an automobile has long been recog-
nized as protected by the fourth amendment from unlawful searches."
However, before Jones, only owners and their lawful bailees could establish
that a search invaded their "privacy interests" in the automobile because
the traditional rule required one to claim and show a possessary or pro-
prietary interest in the premises searched.9" Applying the second rationale
89. E.g., United States ex rel Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa.
1963); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 132, 194 A.2d 150 (1963).
90. Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962) (defendant present dur-
ing search); Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1961) (occupant not pres-
ent during search of corporate office); cf. Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th
Cir. 1963) (search of car belonging to defendant's adult son while neither was present).
91. This also pertains to searches of public areas of commercial stores and pub-
licly owned buildings. If the guest is in a private section of the building, he will
probably be able to invoke its privacy; however, if he is present in the sections which are
public, there is no privacy that he can invoke.
92. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
93. Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921
(1955); Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); see Williams v.
United States, 323 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); Bru-
baker v. United States, 183 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1950); Williams v. United States, 66
F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1933); Mabee v. United States, 60 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1932); Holt
v. United States, 42 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1930); Hogg v. United States, 35 F.2d 954 (5th
Cir. 1929); United States v. Shelton, 59 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Ky. 1945); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964); State v. Littlefield, 213 A.2d 431 (Me.
1965); Head v. State, 136 So. 2d 619 (Miss.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962);
State v. Worley, 383 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); State
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of Jones, it has been held that passengers in automobiles are aggrieved
by an unlawful search of the car in the same manner as the owner, and
therefore both have obtained standing to challenge a search. 4
Deciding whether the requirements laid down in Jones are met becomes
more complex when a search is restricted to one or more automobiles on a
private estate. To have standing, must a defendant be in the automobile at
the time of the search or is his legitimate presence on the estate sufficient
to meet the requirements of the Jones test? In United States v. Costner,95
federal agents made an unlawful entry onto private premises and searched
both an automobile and one of the buildings. The defendants, one a part
time resident, and the other legitimately on the premises, were given stand-
ing to object to evidence seized from the automobile. The implicit reasoning
of the holding is that the defendants' legitimate presence on the private
estate permitted them to invoke the privacy of the automobile and build-
ing located within the curtilage of the home. However, if more than one
guest has a locked automobile on the property of a third party, it is not
clear that one guest would be able to invoke the privacy of the other
guest's locked automobile merely because the one guest is legitimately on
the premises of a third party.
In homes, private offices, and automobiles at least one individual has
the right to exclude all others and to anticipate the privacy of the premises.
v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837 (1962); McDoulett v. State, 368 P.2d 522
(Okla. Crim. App. 1961); cf. State v. Watson, 386 S.W.2d 24 (Mo.), appeal dismissed
mem., 381 U.S. 275 (1965); Weeks, Standing To Object in the Field of Search and
Seizure, 6 Auz. L. REv. 65 (1964).
94. United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962) (passenger of automobile
charged with transporting obscene material in interstate commerce) ; People v. Adorno, 37
Misc. 2d 36, 234 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1962); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374
P.2d 989 (1962) ; see Williams v. United States, 323 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1963) ; United
States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). Contra, McCain v. State, 151 So. 2d
841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (distinction based on difference between a dwelling and an
automobile); Carter v. State, 236 Md. 450, 204 A.2d 322 (1964) (distinction based on
passenger's lack of control of automobile); State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837
(1962).
Passengers in taxicabs also have attempted to gain standing under the second
rationale of Jones. It has been held that individuals in taxicabs have the same right of
privacy as passengers in private automobiles. If a guest in an automobile would have
standing then so should the paying passenger in a taxicab. People v. Adorno, 37
Misc. 2d 36, 234 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1962); see Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253 (1960).
It is clear that if the owner of a car lends his vehicle to a bailee and the bailee later
gives consent to search the car, that consent will not bind the owner who will still have
standing to object. The explanation for this result is that the owner's "privacy interests"
are greater than those of his guest. United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.
1962); State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
95. 217 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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A more complex problem arises in common areas of multiple dwellings,
where no one individual has the right to exclude all others. To date no
court has been willing to accept the argument that a search made in these
areas is an invasion of the personal "privacy interests" of a tenant or his
guest.9" These results seem defensible on the ground that in such common
areas where more than one individual have equal access, no one individual
can reasonably claim "privacy interests" in view of the shared use of the
premises. In Minker v. United States, 11 the Third Circuit was faced with
the argument that a tenant of an apartment building had "privacy interests"
in the outside grounds which would give him standing to object to a search
of a trash can which was placed there for his use and the use of three other
tenants. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court weighed "the
nature of the individual's interest in and the extent of the claimed privacy
in the premises searched.""8  Sometimes, the extent of an individual's
privacy has been determined by an analysis of the "curtilage," within which
one has a right to be free from unreasonable searches. However, attempt-
ing to define "curtilage" may obscure an analysis of the underlying issue,
the "privacy interests" of an individual in the premises searched."0
The significance of the "privacy interests" element of the Jones rationale
is manifested most clearly in the case of an individual legitimately occupy-
96. United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 116
(1965). "[T]he lobby of a multi-tenant apartment house [is not] within the 'curtilage'
of each tenant." Id. at 814. It is important to note that the very basis of the crime
(violation of narcotics laws) was possession of contraband per se and thus the defendant
should have been afforded standing because of the dilemma. Cf. State v. Nash, 74 N.J.
Super. 510, 181 A.2d 555 (Essex County Ct. L. 1962); White v. State, 362 S.W.2d 650
(Tex. Crim. App. 1962). But cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
"[E]ach tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hall-
ways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected inter-
est in the integrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and
entry." Id. at 458 (concurring opinion) (Emphasis added.); People v. Pitts, 26 Ill.
2d 395, 186 N.E.2d 357 (1962).
Difficult decisions with respect to whether a defendant should have standing to
challenge a search are often avoided by the courts. If a search appears patently lawful to
a court, the motion to suppress will be denied ultimately and any examination of the
standing issue would be merely academic. Therefore under these circumstances the
defendant is assumed to have standing, but the motion to suppress is denied on the basis
of the legality of the search. See United States v. Brown, 296 F.2d 565 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1961) (lessee denied standing when search was obviously lawful);
State v. Nash, 74 N.J. Super. 510, 181 A.2d 555 (Essex County Ct. L. 1962); Campos v.
State, 172 Tex. Crim. 179, 356 S.W.2d 317 (1962).
97. 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
98. Id. at 634.
99. United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 116
(1965); United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
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ing a public premises. 1° ° In State v. Bibbo,"'0 the defendant, a customer in
a store, attempted to suppress lottery slips which were picked up by a police
officer after the defendant had dropped them on the floor of the store. The
defendant argued that his lawful presence in the store was sufficient to
entitle him to standing. Obviously, the defendant was unable to establish
any "privacy interests" in the premises searched, a public area, and for
this reason the court denied standing.
Although at one time the defendant was "legitimately on the premises,"
standing will be denied if he has relinquished his association with the prem-
ises before the search occurs."0 2 In Fisher v. United States,' the defendants
faked a robbery of their personal possessions from their living quarters to
collect insurance, and buried these goods in the back yard. Later, the de-
fendants moved from the premises, and investigators found the buried ob-
jects. The defendants, who were charged with conspiracy to commit mail
fraud, were denied standing to suppress the goods because they were not
legitimately on the premises at the time of the search and had no right to
be there.
However, if an initial search occurs when a defendant has a legitimate
interest in the premises and a subsequent search is made after the premises
has been abandoned, standing may still be given if the second search is made
on the basis of information gained during the first. In United States v.
Paroutian,"' the defendant lived in an apartment as a guest of Graziani,
who rented the premises. Federal agents made searches of the apartment
on April 18th and 20th and found a closet with a false wall. On June 19th,
after Graziana and the defendant had been evicted, federal agents again
searched the apartment and removed the false wall for the first time.
Narcotics were found, and the defendant objected to the final search. The
government asserted that standing should be denied because the defendant
was not legitimately on the premises at the time of the successful search, but
100. Ferguson v. State, 236 Md. 148, 202 A.2d 758 (1964) (search of a public
parking lot); State v. Bibbo, 83 N.J. Super. 36, 198 A.2d 810 (App. Div. 1964) (search
of a store).
101. 83 N.J. Super. 36, 198 A.2d 810 (App. Div. 1964). But see United States v.
Pisano, 191 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). It is not clear which section of the store was
searched. If it was a public area, then this holding is directly contrary to Bibbo.
102. Frank v. United States, 347 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed,
86 Sup. Ct. 317 (1965); United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801
(W.D. Pa. 1963); State v. Engberg, 377 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. 1964); Martin v. State, 375
P.2d 481 (Okla. Crim. 1962) (defendant no longer an automobile passenger, has no
standing); cf. United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Commonwealth
v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 999 (1964).
103. 324 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 999 (1964).
104. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss4/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the Second Circuit conferred standing because "an unlawful search taints
all.., leads uncovered by the search."'05 Thus, if the defendant had stand-
ing to object to the first search, he had standing to object to the others.
III. WILL JONES BECOME CONSTITUTIONALLY BINDING
UPON THE STATES?
Because standing determines who may enforce the fourth amendment, it
seems apparent that the Constitution places some limitations on the stand-
ing requirements that a state may adopt. Furthermore, the constitutional
application of the federal exclusionary rule to the states may impliedly in-
clude the federal standing rules as necessary companions.' 0 But even
assuming the application of the federal exclusionary rule to the states does
not automatically encompass the refinements of the federal standing rules
developed in Jones, some guide as to whether the Jones tests will be applied
to the states may be derived from an examination of other federal rules
that have recently been considered for application to the states. 07 In
Ker v. California,' the Supreme Court did not apply the federal knocking
and entry statute0 9 to the states because the statute"0. had not been based on
105. Id. at 489. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92
(1920); United States v. Sheba Bracelets, Inc., 248 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 904 (1957).
106. State v. Manetti, 189 A.2d 426 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963); Belton v. State, 228
Md. 17, 178 A.2d 409 (1962); State v. Parsons, 83 N.J. Super. 430, 200 A.2d 340 (App.
Div. 1964); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 646, 374 P.2d 989, 994 (1962).
In Manetti, the court stated that, "The States now appear not only subject to the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment but also subject to judicial construction thereof by
the Federal Courts." State v. Manetti, supra at 427. "As we see it, the right to object
in a case such as this, where the State proposed to use the illegally seized evidence against
a defendant who was rightfully on the searched premises, is another necessary result of
the Mapp decision." Belton v. State, supra at 23, 178 A.2d at 412. "But in our view the
matter of defendant's standing here is controlled by Jones v. United States . . . ." State
v. Parsons, supra at 443, 200 A.2d at 347. Contra, Leveson v. State, 138 So. 2d. 361,
364 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), aff'd, 151 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1963).
In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), the Supreme Court added strength to
this argument by citing Jones as support for a constitutional limitation on the rule
making power of the states. There is also language in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653
(1961), that suggests that both standing and the Jones rationale may be part and parcel
of the exclusionary rule. However, this language can also be construed as merely bolster-
ing the value of the exclusionary rule.
107. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
108. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1951).
110. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
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the Constitution.' On the other hand, in Aguilar v. Texas,"2 the Court
applied a prior interpretation"'. of the federal probable cause rule" to the
states because the rule had been interpreted "in light of the constitutional""'
requirement. Even though standing is not mentioned in the fourth amend-
ment, it is similar to probable cause because it relates to the implementation
of the fourth amendment in every case and is unlike rules which apply only
to specific types of searches, such as the federal knocking and entry statute
involved in Ker. Moreover, every search and seizure case considered by the
Supreme Court since Mapp with the exception of Ker was held to have a
constitutional base." 6
Furthermore, the federal standing rules could be applied to the states for
the same reason that the federal exclusionary rule was applied to the states
in the Mfapp decision. Even though the fourth amendment does not compel
the use of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court reached the Mapp de-
cision because it felt that the exclusionary rule was the only practical means
of inhibiting state police violations of the fourth amendment. The Supreme
Court could reason further that because the exclusionary rule was partially
ineffective in the federal courts before Jones extended its use, the intended
purpose of the exclusionary rule may not be achieved in the states unless
]ones is applied there also.
Even though the Jones opinion is expressly stated to be an interpretation
of Rule 41 (e),"' the Court has ample constitutional authority upon which
111. However, the dissent points out that the mere fact that a case is decided on the
authority of the supervisory powers of the Court in no way implies that the same result
was not compelled by the fourth amendment. Ker v. California, 374- U.S. 23, 53
(1963). Furthermore, in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), the defendant was con-
victed of possession of clearing house slips. A search of the defendant's person after
arrest was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court as a search incidental to an arrest which
was lawful under the state's requirements of probable cause. The Supreme Court held
that the arrest was illegal because probable cause did not exist. The opinion indicated
that federal standards of probable cause must be applied by the states.
112. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
113. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). The Court's footnote in
Aguilar points out that an arrest warrant was involved in Giordenello but that despite
this distinction the same standard applied in the case at bar. Aguilar v. Texas, supra note
112, at 112 n.3.
114. FED. R. Canm. P. 4.
115. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3 (1964).
116. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (search of an automobile); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search of an
automobile after defendant was in jail was held to be an unreasonable search); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (oral evidence illegally obtained falls within
the realm of Mapp) ; see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (search of hotel room
with consent of owner unreasonable under Mapp).
117. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260 (1960).
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to base the two Jones rationales. The privacy of premises basis for standing
could be founded on the effectuation of privacy safeguards of the fourth
amendment, but the elimination of the dilemma might require the court to
use the fifth amendment along with the fourth. The requirement that a de-
fendant claim a possessory or proprietary interest to obtain standing may
violate the right against self incrimination."1 If the fact of possession
might contribute to the defendant's conviction, to force the defendant to
confess that fact would be tantamount to compelling him to incriminate
himself." 9 Some courts have held that this position is untenable because no
person is required to enforce his fourth amendment rights, and therefore,
the decision to claim and prove standing is voluntary." However, it is sub-
mitted that such an approach leads to the conclusion that in some situations
a person is not entitled to the protection of both the fourth and fifth
amendments at the same time.12'
118. "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. Whether the Supreme Court would extend the
privilege against self incrimination to require an exemption from standing is a matter of
conjecture. There are obviously some situations in which the required claim would not
be incriminating to the defendant. To exempt the defendant from establishing standing,
it might be asserted, would be a fairer way to treat the accused because he should be
free in formulating every possible defense against the prosecution's efforts to establish the
incriminating fact of possession. To establish a fifth amendment right under the tra-
ditional case law, a defendant need not prove that his statements would be incriminating;
he must merely assert that to speak might tend to be incriminating. E.g., Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951). This argument recently found added strength
when for the first time the fifth amendment was applied to the states. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
A related constitutional concept that could be used to support the Jones solution for
the dilemma is that convictions must result from the use of methods that are consistent
with our accusatorial theory of criminal justice. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921). For a recognition of the close relationship of these two theories see Malloy v.
Hogan, supra at 8-9. According to this theory, fundamental constitutional principles
command the prosecutor to prove his case by the use of evidence secured independent of
the cooperation of the defendant. If the defendant is forced or strongly induced to admit
facts which aid the prosecution in proving the offense charged, then our system of
criminal justice degenerates into the inquisitorial type. See Watts v. Indiana, supra at 54.
Furthermore, if the defendant is induced to waive his fourth amendment right because
he feels that he should not make the required claim of standing, then an effective defense
would be cleared from the prosecution's path to conviction. This result would be a devia-
tion from our strictly accusatorial system.
119. See Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933).
120. See Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932); Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 567 (1932); Vaught v. United States, 7 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1925);
State v. Williams, 69 Ohio App. 361, 41 N.E.2d 717 (1941); Bell v. State, 94 Tex.
Crim. 226, 250 S.W. 177 (1923), writ of error dismissed, 266 U.S. 640 (1924).
121. See Heller v. United States, supra note 120, at 629-30 (dissenting opinion).
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IV. CALIFORNIA AND NEw YORK
California adopted the exclusionary rule in 1955.22 and shortly there-
after, in People v. Martin23 the traditional standing rules were challenged.
The Supreme Court of California responded by completely abolishing all
requirements for standing. Justice Traynor reasoned that if the purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to prevent unlawful police activity, any procedure
which condones illegal practices is inconsistent with that purpose and
should be prohibited."' However, the potentially inhibiting effect on police
practices may have been lessened by lowering the level of probable cause
needed to make a lawful arrest. 2
Arguments which support California's novel venture recognize that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police from obtaining evi-
dence illegally; thus when the use of any unlawfully obtained evidence is
allowed by denying standing to a defendant, the effect is to undermine the
express reason for having the exclusionary rule. On the other hand, those
in favor of standing requirements base their opinion on an abhorrence of
the coddling of criminals. This argument, as set forth by Mr. Justice
Cardozo, is, why should "[t]he criminal ... go free because the constable
has blundered."' 26 In addition, it is argued that only those whose rights have
122. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion [the exclusionary rule] because
other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional
provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts
under the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect
condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at
911-12.
123. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). For additional commentary see Paulsen,
Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 65 (1957); Comment,
55 MICH. L. Rlv. 567 (1957) ; Note, Procedures for Suppressing Illegally Seized Evidence,
20 MONT. L. REv. 225 (1959); Note, 15 Wyo. L.J. 218 (1961).
124. [I]f law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by
obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is to
that extent nullified. Moreover, such a limitation virtually invites law enforcement
officers to violate the rights of third parties and to trade the escape of a criminal
whose rights are violated for the conviction of others by the use of the evidence
illegally obtained against them. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d
855, 857 (1955). Since all of the reasons that compelled us to adopt the exclusionary
rule are applicable whenever evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional guar-
antees, such evidence is inadmissable whether or not it was obtained in violation of
the particular defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 761, 290 P.2d at 857.
Accord, People v. Ibarra, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963) (unlawful possession
of heroin); People v. Jager, 303 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1956) (burglary and conspiracy); People
v. Calonna, 295 P.2d 490 (Cal. 1956) (possession of Indian Hemp); People v. Silva,
295 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1956) (unlawful possession of narcotics); People v. Kitchens, 294
P.2d 17 (Cal. 1956) (possession of narcotics).
125. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 106,
293 P.2d 57 (1956); Note, 50 GEo. L.J. 585, 596-97 (1962). But see Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964).
126. People v. Defoe, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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been invaded should have standing to complain. To date California stands
alone as the only state without standing requirements.
New York deserves special consideration because its statutory standing
requirement has been interpreted as codifying the California rule. The
statute reads in part, "A person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure ... may move for the return of such property or for the
suppression of its use as evidence."'' Two trial judges, who have had oc-
casion to interpret this statute, have reached contrary conclusions about the
statute's meaning.'28 Judge Sobel in People v. Smith." and again in People
v. Estrada" construed the statute as a codification of the California rule.
His contention is that "it was the intention of the Legislature to confer
'standing' upon any person having reasonable grounds to believe that the
product of the search may be used as evidence against him.""' Judge
Shapiro, on the other hand, contends that the statute is no more than the
traditional rule."'- His argument is that the defendant must not only claim
but also prove that he is "aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." To
date the state's Appellate Division has not resolved these conflicting inter-
pretations.
V. SHOULD STANDING BE REQUIRED?
Standing reflects whether the defendant has been affected in a man-
ner that is within the scope of the fourth amendment's protection, and only
if he has, can he challenge the legality of the search. Under this procedure,
the relief provided for a violation of the fourth amendment becomes opera-
tive only to persons who can obtain standing. Because of the intimate rela-
127. N.Y. CODE CM. PRoc. § 813-C.
128. Compare People v. Smith, 35 Misc. 2d 533, 230 N.Y.S.2d. 894 (Kings County
Ct. 1962), with People v. Cefaro, 45 Misc. 2d 990, 258 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
129. 35 Misc. 2d 533, 230 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Kings County Ct. 1962). This case is also
significant for Judge Sobel's interpretation of Jones. It is his belief that the first rationale
is limited only to contraband while the second branch is limited to fruits and instrumen-
talities. Thus, if a person legitimately on the premises is charged with possession of
contraband, standing must be granted on the basis of the charged with possession rationale
and cannot be obtained on the basis of legitimate presence on the premises. However,
it is submitted that the two rationales of Jones are not mutually exclusive. Hence, the
mere fact that a defendant is charged with possessing contraband does not, for that rea-
son, bar the granting of standing under the premises rationale.
130. 44 Misc. 2d 452, 253 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1964); see People v. Kramer, 38
Misc. 2d 889, 239 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
131. People v. Smith, 35 Misc. 2d 533, 541, 230 N.Y.S.2d 894, 902 (Kings County Ct.
1962).
132. People v. Cefaro, 45 Misc. 2d 990, 258 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1965); see
People v. Quagliana, 46 Misc. 2d 887, 261 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Erie County Ct. 1965).
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tionship between standing and the constitutional guarantee, it is necessary
that standing be consistent with the desired goals of the exclusionary rule,
the expressed means for enforcing that guarantee.
The fourth amendment protects "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects . ". .." Traditionally, the relief
available for a violation of the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule, was
limited only to those individuals whose personal interests were invaded.'34
However, this view seems inconsistent with the most recently announced
purpose of the exclusionary rule, to protect the people as a whole from un-
lawful police practices.' Although personal interests are safeguarded by
the fourth amendment, the Court has placed overriding emphasis on the
protection of society from unlawful police conduct. Because the other
methods of preventing unlawful police conduct had failed, the exclusionary
rule was felt to be the only effective means of enforcing the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. This being the goal of the Court,
the scope of the amendment may be to protect the entire public, and thus
the people as a whole should have the right to enforce the exclusionary rule.
If one may invoke the exclusionary rule only if his personal interests are
invaded by an unlawful search, the police may continue to disregard the
fourth amendment and use illegally seized evidence against those whose
personal rights have not been invaded.
There are several steps that may be taken to make the standing rules
more consistent with the present basis for the exclusionary rule. At the
least, standing should be made freely available to every person who can
fulfill the new requirements as liberalized by the second rationale of
Jones. The dilemma of any individual defendant could be completely
eliminated by excluding from the trial any incriminating claims or state-
ments made by the defendant to establish standing at the suppression hear-
ing. Alternatively, the first branch of Jones could be applied not only when
the defendant is "charged with a crime of possession," but in all situations
in which the defendant would be confronted with the dilemma. Either of
these measures would be sufficient to protect most well represented indi-
viduals, but in light of the most recent expressions of the purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule, to deter acts of privacy invasion by the police to the fullest
extent, they are not sufficient. To achieve that overall social purpose most
clearly and completely, the entire concept of standing will have to be
133. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
134. Chicco v. United States, 284 Fed. 434 (4th Cir. 1922); United States v.
Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
135. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955).
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eliminated as a prerequisite to raising the claim of a fourth amendment
violation. This was done in the California case of People v. Martin.13
There, Justice Traynor reasoned that any use of illegally obtained evidence
would undermine the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and con-
cluded that evidence, unconstitutionally obtained, must be excluded
"whether or not it was obtained in violation of the particular defendant's
constitutional rights."' 37 This seems to be the most effective and widely
beneficial solution to the fourth amendment standing problem that has yet
been articulated.
136. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
137. Id. at 761, 290 P.2d at 857.
Washington University Open Scholarship
